


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From the desk of-

MAJOR GENERAL C. A. WILLOUGHBY

"Foreign Intelligence Digest"

Dear Mr. Duller -

60-4432

Further to our amicable, exploratory correspondence, the Denver clipping should be sufficient as an index of my goodwill. I have often received requests for a piece on C.I.A. - The implied design was "something critical",.....

Heretofore, I refused to become a party to this design. However, lately (naturally) renewed requests have come for an article about you and the C.I.A., or a blend of the material.

I have read the piece in the London "Observer". I have now before me Nr 22 of "Der Spiegel" May 25th. Spiegel is apparently related to News Week (or at least have some editorial understanding, as they often "concur" in some trend or tendency).

I suggest that an article is both timely and worthwhile. Written by an intelligence specialist (as I claim to be), it would probably be widely acceptable. Anyway, I have my journalistic outlets, in print and radio, in any event.

I have no doubt that you have previous material or studies that could be made available to me. I am quite agreeable to have you go over the manuscript for changes or additions. In fact, you can write your own ticket. I understand your problems perhaps as well as anybody - including the intramural pressures, that are never publicly known. With kind personal regards

Trustingly
W. Willoughby

Mr Allen W Dulles
The Director, Central
Intelligence Agency

May 23/60

Dear Mr Dulles -

This is to acknowledge your letter of May 18th. You raised some points which I will cover in their original sequence ; 1) The enclosures (March issue "Mercury" etc.) were reprinted in the recent Congressional Hearings. I have said much the same thing , over the years - the situation has remained static , the Russian menace has not improved or diminished ? The essential items I am interested in, then and now, are a) a program to get our dawdling Allies to defend themselves and b) a revised policy vis-avis Berlin , a new approach.

2) Participation in your training activities : Hold your views in abeyance until you have received a copy of my "Maneuver in War" i.e. my course in Leavenworth 1930-1935. It is a historical resumé of the art of war, in the last Century The analysis of case -histories in a seminar of historical investigation etc. - Personnel in the C.I.A . (with limited military-strategic experience) can be fully oriented, in this course to thereafter be on familiar ,intellectual ground, in dealing with military Staffs and Headqrs, in a planning or liaison basis. It may bridge the gap between C.I.A. and the intelligence sections of the Services. You may recall that I expressed surprise, on examining your charter , to find that your Deputy (perennial ?) was an Air Officer ; I felt then (and now) that Army and Navy should have been equally represented.

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3) You expressed interest in a forthcoming article on the Sverdlovsk flight. In the meantime, I went on record in Denver, May 13th. I will probably pursue the same thought; at anyrate, I will back up the C.I.A., or general strategic intelligence operations. As the Denver reported translated it rather freely : "Tant de bruit pour une omelette "

4) I will mail you other pieces , with no particular is ue in mind. I covered Spain, in January, in the Mercury; again an old story (to me) since my study "Bailen and the Spanish Bridge Head" induced Senator McCarran and Sec Forrestal to offset the U.N. conspiracy of 1947 .

In general terms, I have felt that you (and other Federal enterprises) do not make sufficient use of retired specialists. On the other hand, time is fleeting - and I have built my own European contacts, for my own amusement.

With kind personal regards

Tratantly
William

PLANE—From Page A2

Expert Calls Spy Fuss 'Noise Over an Omelet'

By KEN PEARCE
Staff Mountain News Writer

...beating? And if the United States Government had not ...

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
...Party "operating in every coun- try." He was encouraged by the fact the spy plane got some 1400 miles inside Russia. "This looks aw- fully good for SAC (Strategic Air Command)," he said. As for the fate of the spy plane, Francis G. Powers, ... Willoughby ... to be ...

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—Society for the Study of the History of the

DRAFT LEGISLATION TO AMEND FURTHER THE "NATIONAL
SECURITY ACT OF 1950, AS AMENDED
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

MAP~



Allied Secret
 Russian Secret

PLATE No. 1
 SOVIET SHORT- AND MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES FROM CZECH ROCKET SITES

The advent of the Sputnik forced our laggard or prudently silent intelligence
 prices to admit that the Soviets have a growing arsenal of missiles. They are
 ICBM, 1,500 miles, to the ICBM, 5,000 miles. This Czech satellite
 of military encampments in the former Baltic States, in Communist
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 of military encampments in the former Baltic States, in Communist
 of military encampments in the former Baltic States, in Communist

MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1960

783

Israel, from the military viewpoint, is a most valuable outpost for the West, a "bridgehead" in Minor Asia. Actually, instead of sending a Marine brigade, (though I am especially fond of the Marines since I have seen them in Korea in the winter of 1951) the Lebanese should be sent to Israel. I don't think that I should like to lose Israel as a potential military ally for that reason.

Chairman MORGAN. General Willoughby, you may proceed.

General WILLOUGHBY. Thank you, sir. I shall proceed then to talk selectively against these references, tables, charts, and illustrations which you so kindly authorized. I am unable to furnish a printed preliminary statement for distribution, but will present it verbally instead.


MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1960

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The decline in Western (NATO) armaments—Ready divisions from 1914 to 1959

Country	World War I	World War II	1928	1957	1959	Percentage 1959 compared with 1928
Bombarders	18	29	17	4.5	4.5	25
United States	34	72	12	5	5	41
United Kingdom	89	49	23	4.5	4	20
France	115	50	30	7	7	23
Germany	228	190	10	3	7	30
Italy	45	54	26	3	8	8
Spain	26	25	11	11	11	100
Russia	225	225		175	175	

1. BeneLux was overrun twice in World Wars I and II.
2. The United States has always had a modest peace establishment; the comparative percentage is thus not out of context. Our "watcher" in West Europe is formidable. Europe should be defended by Europeans.
3. Britain plans to withdraw partially (and may still do so). The debate of Euros shows that she is not unprepared for overruns.
4. The US has 13 divisions for NATO, has withdrawn the bulk of her troops for employment elsewhere. Her reserves are normally vast, but will be delayed by nuclear attacks.
5. One becomes one of the mainstays of the NATO arsenal.
6. H. Spiedel has been designated commander in Germany. He is extremely vulnerable to missile attack.
7. NATO post (Denmark-Berlin).
8. Naval and air bases are



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